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Abstract
We present an axiomatic framework for thermodynamics that in-
corporates information as a fundamental concept. The axioms de-
scribe both ordinary thermodynamic processes and those in which in-
formation is acquired, used and erased, as in the operation of Maxwell’s
demon. This system, similar to previous axiomatic systems for thermo-
dynamics, supports the construction of conserved quantities and an
entropy function governing state changes. Here, however, the entropy
exhibits both information and thermodynamic aspects. Although our
axioms are not based upon probabilistic concepts, a natural and highly
useful concept of probability emerges from the entropy function itself.
Our abstract system has many models, including both classical and
quantum examples.
1 Introduction
Axiomatic approaches to physics are useful for exploring the conceptual ba-
sis and logical structure of a theory. One classic example was presented by
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Robin Giles over fifty years ago in his monograph Mathematical Foundations
of Thermodynamics [1]. His theory is constructed upon three phenomeno-
logical concepts: thermodynamic states, an operation (+) that combines
states into composites, and a relation (→) describing possible state transfor-
mations. From a small number of basic axioms, Giles derives a remarkable
amount of thermodynamic machinery, including conserved quantities (“com-
ponents of content”), the existence of an entropy function that characterizes
irreversibility for possible processes, and so on.
Alternative axiomatic developments of thermodynamics have been con-
structed by others along different lines. One notable example is the frame-
work of Lieb and Yngvason [2, 3] (which has recently been used by Thess as
the basis for a textbook [4]). Giles’s abstract system, meanwhile, has found
application beyond the realm of classical thermodynamics, e.g., in the theory
of quantum entanglement [5].
Other work on the foundations of thermodynamics has focused on the
concept of information. Much of this has been inspired by Maxwell’s fa-
mous thought-experiment of the demon [6]. The demon is an entity that
can acquire and use information about the microscopic state of a thermody-
namic system, producing apparent violations of the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics. These violations are only “apparent” because the demon is itself
a physical system, and its information processes are also governed by the
underlying dynamical laws.
Let us examine a highly simplified example of the demon at work. Our
thermodynamic system is a one-particle gas enclosed in a container (a simple
system also used in [7]). The gas may be allowed to freely expand into a larger
volume, but this process is irreversible. A “free compression” process that
took the gas from a larger to a smaller volume with no other net change
would decrease the entropy of the system and contradict the Second Law.
See Figure 1.
Now, we introduce the demon, which is a machine that can interact with
the gas particle and acquire information about its location. The demon
contains a one-bit memory register, initially in the state 0. First, a partition
is introduced in the container, so that the gas particle is confined to the
upper or lower half (U or L). The demon measures the gas particle and
records its location in memory, with 0 standing for U and 1 for L. On the
basis of this memory bit value, the demon moves the volume containing the
particle. In the end, the gas particle is confined to one particular smaller
volume, apparently reducing the entropy of the system. This is illustrated in
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Figure 1: A one-particle gas may freely expand to occupy a larger volume,
but the reverse process would violate the Second Law.
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Figure 2: A Maxwell’s demon device acquires one bit of information about
the location of a gas particle, allowing it to contract the gas to a smaller
volume.
Figure 2.
As Bennett pointed out [8], every demon operation we have described
can be carried out reversibly, with no increase in global entropy. Even the
“measurement” process can be described by a reversible interaction between
the particle location and the demon’s memory bit b, changing the states
according to
(U, b) L9999K (U, b) (L, b) L9999K (L, b¯), (1)
where b¯ is the binary negation of b. However, the demon process as described
leaves the demon in a new situation, since an initially blank memory register
now stores a bit of information. To operate in a cycle (and thus unambigu-
ously violate the Second Law), the demon must erase this bit and recover
the blank memory. However, as Landauer showed [9], the erasure of a bit of
information is always accompanied by an entropy increase of at least kB ln 2
in the surroundings, just enough to ensure that there is no overall entropy
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decrease in the demon’s operation. The Second Law remains valid.
Information erasure is a physical process. The demon we have described
can also erase a stored bit simply by reversing the steps outlined. Depending
on the value of the bit register, the demon moves the gas particle to one of
two corresponding regions separated by a partition. The same interaction
that accomplished the “measurement” process (which takes (U, 0) 99K (U, 0)
and (L, 0) 99K (L, 1)) can now be used to reset the bit value to 0 (taking
(U, 0) 99K (U, 0) and (L, 1) 99K (L, 0)). In other words, the information
stored redundantly in both the gas and the register is “uncopied”, so that
it remains only in the gas. Finally, the partition is removed and the gas
expands to the larger volume. The net effect is to erase the memory register
while increasing the entropy of the gas by an amount kB ln 2, in conventional
units.
Another link between thermodynamics and information comes from sta-
tistical mechanics. As Jaynes has shown [10, 11], the concepts and measures
of information devised by Shannon for communication theory [12] can be
used in the statistical derivation of macroscopic thermodynamic properties.
In a macroscopic system, we typically possess only a small amount of in-
formation about a few large-scale parameters (total energy, volume, etc.).
According to Jaynes, we should therefore choose a probability distribution
over microstates that maximizes the Shannon entropy, consistent with our
data. That is to say, the rational probability assignment includes no infor-
mation (in the Shannon sense) except that found in the macroscopic state of
the system. This prescription yields the usual distributions used in statistical
mechanics, from which thermodynamic properties may be derived.
Axiomatic theories and information analyses each provide important in-
sights into the meaning of thermodynamics. The purpose of this paper is
to synthesize these two approaches. We will present an axiomatic basis for
thermodynamics that uses information ideas from the very outset. In such
a theory, Maxwell’s demon, which accomplishes state changes by acquiring
information, is neither a paradox nor a sideshow curiosity. Instead, it is a
central conceptual tool for understanding the transformations between ther-
modynamic states. In our view, thermodynamics is essentially a theory of
the descriptions of systems possessed by agents that are themselves (like the
demon) physical systems. These descriptions may change as the external
systems undergo various processes; however, they also may change when the
agent acquires, uses or discards information.
Our work is thus similar in spirit to that of Weilenmann et al. [13], though
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our approach is very different. They essentially take the Lieb-Yngvason ax-
iomatic framework and apply it to various quantum resource theories. In
particular, for the resource theory of non-uniformity [14], the Lieb-Yngvason
entropy function coincides with the von Neumann entropy of the quantum
density operator, which is a measure of quantum information. We, on the
other hand, seek to modify axiomatic thermodynamics itself to describe pro-
cesses involving “information engines” such as Maxwell’s demon. We do not
rely on any particular microphysics and have both classical and quantum
models for our axioms. The connections we find between information and
thermodynamic entropy are thus as general as the axioms themselves. Fur-
thermore, to make our concept of information as clear as possible, we will
seek to base our development on the most elementary ideas of state and
process.
We therefore take as our prototype the axiomatic theory of Giles [1]. In
fact, Giles’s monograph contains two different axiomatic developments. (The
first system is presented in Chapters 1–6 of Giles’s book, and the second is
introduced beginning in Chapter 7.) The first, which we might designate
Giles I, is based on straightforward postulates about the properties of states
and processes. The second, Giles II, is more sophisticated and powerful.
The axioms are less transparent in meaning (e.g., the assumed existence of
“anti-equilibrium” and “internal” thermodynamic states), but they support
stronger theorems. This difference can be illustrated by the status of entropy
functions in the two developments. In Giles I, it is shown that an entropy
function exists; in fact, there may be many such functions. In Giles II, it
is shown that an absolute entropy function, one that is zero for every anti-
equilibrium state, exists and is unique. Giles himself regarded the second
system as “The Formal Theory”, which he summarizes in an Appendix of
that title.
The information-based system we present here, on the other hand, is
closer to the more elementary framework of Giles I. We have taken some
care to use notation and concepts that are as analogous as possible to that
theory. We derive many of Giles’s propositions, including some that he uses
as axioms. Despite the similarities, however, even the most elementary ideas
(such as the combination of states represented by the + operation) will re-
quire some modifications. These changes highlight the new ideas embodied
in axiomatic information thermodynamics, and so we will take some care to
discuss them as they arise.
Section 2 introduces the fundamental idea of an eidostate, including how
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two or more eidostates may be combined. In Section 3, we introduce the →
relation between eidostates: A → B means that eidostate A can be trans-
formed into eidostate B, with no other net change in the apparatus that
accomplishes the transformation. The collection of processes has an alge-
braic structure, which we present in Section 4. We introduce our concept of
information in Section 5 and show that the structure of information processes
imposes a unique entropy measure on pure information states.
Section 6 introduces axioms inspired by Maxwell’s demon and shows their
implications for processes involving thermodynamic states. Sections 7 and 8
outline how our information axioms also yield Giles’s central results about
thermodynamic processes, including the existence of an entropy function,
conserved components of content, and mechanical states. In Section 10, we
see that an entropy function can be extended in a unique way to a wider
class of “uniform” eidostates. This, rather remarkably, gives rise to a unique
probability measure within uniform eidostates, as we describe in Section 11.
Sections 12 and 13 present two detailed models of our axioms, each one
highlighting a different aspect of the theory. We conclude in Section 14 with
some remarks on the connection between information and thermodynamic
entropy, a connection that emerges necessarily from the structure of processes
in our theory.
2 Eidostates
Giles [1] bases his development on a set S of states. The term “state” is
undefined in the formal theory, but heuristically it represents an equilibrium
macrostate of some thermodynamic system. (Giles, in fact, identifies a ∈ S
with some method of preparation; the concept of a “system” does not appear
in his theory, or in ours.) States can be combined using the + operation, so
that if a, b ∈ S then a + b ∈ S also. The new state a + b is understood as
the state of affairs arising from simultaneous and independent preparations
of states a and b. For Giles, this operation is commutative and associative;
for example, a+ b is exactly the same state as b+ a.
We also have a set S . However, our theory differs in two major respects.
First, the combination of states is not assumed to be commutative and asso-
ciative. On the contrary, we regard a+ b and b+ a as entirely distinct states
for any a 6= b. The motivation for this is that the way that a composite state
is assembled encodes information about its preparation, and we want to be
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able to keep track of this information. On the states in S , the operation
+ is simply that of forming a Cartesian pair of states: a + b = (a, b), and
nothing more.
A second and more far-reaching difference is that we cannot confine our
theory to individual elements of S . A theory that keeps track of information
in a physical system must admit non-deterministic processes. For instance, if
a measurement is made, the single state a before the measurement may result
in any one of a collection of possible states {a0, a1, . . . , an} corresponding to
the various results.
Therefore, our basic notion is the eidostate, which is a finite nonempty set
of states. The term “eidostate” derives from the Greek word eidos, meaning
“to see”. The eidostate is a collection of states that may be regarded as
possible from the point of view of some agent. The set of eidostates is desig-
nated by E . When we combine two eidostates A,B ∈ E into the composite
A + B, we mean the set of all combinations a + b of elements of these sets.
That is, A+B is exactly the Cartesian product (commonly denoted A×B)
for the sets. Thus, our state combination operation + is very different from
that envisioned by Giles. His operation is an additional structure on S that
requires an axiom to fix its properties, whereas we simply use the Cartesian
product provided by standard set theory, which we of course assume.
Some eidostates in E are Cartesian products of other sets (which are also
eidostates); some eidostates are not, and are thus “prime”. We assume that
each eidostate has a “prime factorization” into a finite number of components.
Here, is our first axiom:
Axiom 1. Eidostates: E is a collection of sets called eidostates such that:
(a) Every A ∈ E is a finite nonempty set with a finite prime Cartesian
factorization.
(b) A+B ∈ E if and only if A,B ∈ E .
(c) Every nonempty subset of an eidostate is also an eidostate.
Part (c) of this axiom ensures, among other things, that every element
a of an eidostate can be associated with a singleton eidostate {a}. Without
too much confusion, we can simply denote any singleton eidostate {a} by
the element it contains, writing a instead. We can therefore regard the set of
statesS in two ways. Either we may think ofS as the collection of singleton
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eidostates in E , or we may say that S is the collection of all elements of all
eidostates: S =
⋃
A∈E
A. Either way, the set E characterized by Axiom 1 is
the more fundamental object.
Our “eidostates” are very similar to the “specifications” introduced by del
Rio et al. [15] in their general framework for resource theories of knowledge.
The two ideas, however, are not quite identical. To begin with, a specification
V may be any subset of a state space Ω, whereas the eidostates in E are
required to be finite nonempty subsets of S—and indeed, not every such
subset need be an eidostate. For example, the union A∪B of two eidostates
is not necessarily an eidostate. The set E therefore does not form a Boolean
lattice. Specifications are a general concept applicable to state spaces of many
different kinds, and are used in [15] to analyze different resource theories and
to express general notions of approximation and locality. We, however, will
be restricting our attention to an E (and S ) with very particular properties,
expressed by Axiom 1 and our later axioms, that are designed to model
thermodynamics in the presence of information engines such as Maxwell’s
demon.
Composite eidostates are formed by combining eidostates with the +
operation (Cartesian product). The same pieces may be combined in different
ways. We say that A,B ∈ E are similar (written A ∼ B) if they are made
up of the same components. That is, A ∼ B provided there are eidostates
E1, . . . , En such that A = FA(E1, . . . , En) and B = FB(E1, . . . , En) for two
Cartesian product formulas FA and FB. Thus,
(E1 + E2) + E3 ∼ E2 + (E1 + E3), (2)
and so on. The similarity relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on E .
We sometimes wish to combine an eidostate with itself several times. For
the integer n ≥ 1, we denote by nA the eidostate A + (A + . . .), where A
appears n times in the nested Cartesian product. This is one particular way
to combine the n instances of A, though of course all such ways are similar.
Thus, we may assert equality in A + nA = (n + 1)A, but only similarity in
nA+ A ∼ (n+ 1)A.
Finally, we note that we have introduced as yet no probabilistic ideas. An
eidostate is a simple enumeration of possible states, without any indication
that some are more or less likely than others. However, as we will see in
Section 11, in certain contexts, a natural probability measure for states does
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emerge from our axioms.
3 Processes
In the axiomatic thermodynamics of Giles, the → relation describes state
transformations. The relation a→ b means that there exists another state z
and a definite time interval τ ≥ 0 so that
a+ z
τ b+ z, (3)
where
τ indicates time evolution over the period τ . The pair (z, τ) is the
“apparatus” that accomplishes the transformation from a to b. This dy-
namical evolution is a deterministic process; that is, in the presence of the
apparatus (z, τ) the initial state a is guaranteed to evolve to the final state
b. This rule of interpretation for→ motivates the properties assumed for the
relation in the axioms.
Our version of the arrow relation→ is slightly different, in that it encom-
passes non-deterministic processes. Again, we envision an apparatus (z, τ)
and we write
a+ z
τ99K b+ z, (4)
to mean that the initial state a + z may possibly evolve to b + z over the
stated interval. Then, for eidostates A and B, the relation A → B means
that, if a ∈ A and b ∈ S , then there exists an apparatus (z, τ) such that
a+z
τ99K b+z only if b ∈ B. Each possible initial state a in A might evolve to
one or more final states, but all of the possible final states are contained in B.
For singleton eidostates a and b, the relation a→ b represents a deterministic
process, as in Giles’s theory.
Again, we use our heuristic interpretation of → to motivate the essential
properties specified in an axiom:
Axiom 2. Processes: Let eidostates A,B,C ∈ E , and s ∈ S .
(a) If A ∼ B, then A→ B.
(b) If A→ B and B → C, then A→ C.
(c) If A→ B, then A+ C → B + C.
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(d) If A+ s→ B + s, then A→ B.
Part (a) of the axiom asserts that it is always possible to “rearrange the
pieces” of a composite state. Thus, A + B → B + A and so on. Of course,
since ∼ is a symmetric relation, A ∼ B implies both A → B and B → A,
which we might write as A↔ B.
Part (b) says that a process from A to C may proceed via an intermediate
eidostate B. Parts (c) and (d) establish the relationship between → and +.
We can always append a “bystander” state C to any process A→ B, and a
bystander singleton state s in A + s → B + s can be viewed as part of the
apparatus that accomplishes the transformation A→ B.
We use the → relation to characterize various conceivable processes. A
formal process is simply a pair of eidostates 〈A,B〉. Following Giles, we may
say that 〈A,B〉 is:
• natural if A→ B;
• antinatural if B → A;
• possible if A→ B or B → A (which may be written A
 B);
• impossible if it is not possible;
• reversible if A↔ B; and
• irreversible if it is possible but not reversible.
Thus, any formal process must be one of four types : reversible, natural irre-
versible, antinatural irreversible, or impossible.
Any nonempty subset of an eidostate is an eidostate. If the eidostate
A is an enumeration of possible states, the proper subset eidostate B ( A
may be regarded as an enumeration with some additional condition present
that eliminates one or more of the possibilities. What can we say about
processes involving these “conditional” eidostates? To answer this question,
we introduce two further axioms. The first is this:
Axiom 3. If A,B ∈ E and B is a proper subset of A, then A9 B.
This expresses the idea that no natural process can simply eliminate a
state from a list of possibilities. This is a deeper principle than it first
appears. Indeed, as we will find, in our theory, it is the essential ingredient
in the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
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To express the second new axiom, we must introduce the notion of a
uniform eidostate. The eidostate A is said to be uniform provided, for every
a, b ∈ A, we have a 
 b. That is, every pair of states in A is connected by
a possible process. This means that all of the A states are “comparable” in
some way involving the → relation.
All singleton eidostates are uniform. Are there any non-uniform ei-
dostates? The axioms in fact do not tell us. We will find models of the
axioms that contain non-uniform eidostates and others that contain none.
Even if there are states a, b ∈ S for which a9 b and b9 a, nothing in our
axioms guarantees the existence of an eidostate that contains both a and b
as elements. We denote the set of uniform eidostates by U ⊆ E .
Now, we may state the second axiom about conditional processes.
Axiom 4. Conditional processes:
(a) Suppose A,A′ ∈ E and b ∈ S . If A→ b and A′ ⊆ A then A′ → b.
(b) Suppose A and B are uniform eidostates that are each disjoint unions
of eidostates: A = A1∪A2 and B = B1∪B2. If A1 → B1 and A2 → B2
then A→ B.
The first part makes sense given our interpretation of the → relation in
terms of an apparatus (z, τ). If every a ∈ A satisfies a+ z τ99K b+ z for only
one state b, then the same will be true for every a ∈ A′ ⊆ A. Part (b) of the
axiom posits that, if we can find an apparatus whose dynamics transforms
A1 states into B1 states, and another whose dynamics transforms A2 states
into B2 states, then we can devise a apparatus with “conditional dynamics”
that does both tasks, taking A to B. This is a rather strong proposition, and
we limit its scope by restricting it to the special class of uniform eidostates.
We can as a corollary extend Part (b) of Axiom 4 to more than two
subsets. That is, suppose A,B ∈ U and the sets A and B are each partitioned
into n mutually disjoint, nonempty subsets: A = A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An and B =
B1∪· · ·Bn. In addition, suppose Ak → Bk for all k = 1, . . . , n. Then, A→ B.
4 Process Algebra and Irreversibility
Following Giles, we now explore the algebraic structure of formal processes
and describe how the type of a possible process may be characterized by a
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single real-valued function. Although the broad outlines of our development
will follow that of Giles [1], there are significant differences. (For example,
in our theory, the unrestricted set P of eidostate processes does not form a
group.)
There is an equivalence relation among formal processes, based on the
similarity relation ∼ among eidostates. We say that 〈A,B〉 .= 〈C,D〉 if there
exist singletons x, y ∈ S such that A+ x ∼ C + y and B+ x ∼ D+ y. That
is, if we augment the eidostates in 〈A,B〉 by x and those in 〈C,D〉 by y,
the corresponding eidostates in the two processes are mere rearrangements
of each other. It is not hard to establish that this is an equivalence relation.
Furthermore, equivalent processes (under
.
=) are always of the same type. To
see this, suppose that if 〈A,B〉 .= 〈C,D〉 and A→ B. Then, A+ x ∼ C + y,
etc., and
C + y → A+ x→ B + x→ D + y. (5)
Hence, C → D. It is a straightforward corollary that A → B if and only if
C → D.
Processes (or more strictly, equivalence classes of processes under
.
=) have
an algebraic structure. We define the sum of two processes as
〈A,B〉+ 〈C,D〉 = 〈A+ C,B +D〉 , (6)
and the negation of a process as −〈A,B〉 = 〈B,A〉. We call the − operation
“negation” even though in general −〈A,B〉 is not the additive inverse of
〈B,A〉. Such an inverse may not exist. As we will see, however, the negation
does yield an additive inverse process in some important special contexts.
The sum and negation operations on processes are both compatible with
the equivalence
.
=. That is, first, if 〈A,B〉 .= 〈A′, B′〉 then −〈A,B〉 .=
−〈A′, B′〉. Furthermore, if 〈A,B〉 .= 〈A′, B′〉 and 〈C,D〉 .= 〈C ′, D′〉, then
〈A,B〉+ 〈C,D〉 .= 〈A′, B′〉+ 〈C ′, D′〉 . (7)
This means that the sum and negation operations are well-defined on equiv-
alence classes of processes. If [〈A,B〉] and [〈C,D〉] denote two equivalence
classes represented by 〈A,B〉 and 〈C,D〉, then
[〈A,B〉] + [〈C,D〉] = [〈A+ C,B +D〉] , (8)
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which is the same regardless of the particular representatives chosen to indi-
cate the two classes being added.
We let P denote the collection of all equivalence classes of formal pro-
cesses. Then, the sum operation both is associative and commutative on P .
Furthermore, it contains a zero element 0 = [〈s, s〉] for some singleton s.
That is, if Γ = [〈A,B〉],
Γ + 0 = [〈A,B〉] + [〈s, s〉] = [〈A+ s, B + s〉] = [〈A,B〉] = Γ. (9)
The set P is thus a monoid (a semigroup with identity) under the operation
+. Moreover, the subset PS of singleton processes—equivalence classes of
formal processes with singleton initial and final states—is actually an Abelian
group, since
[〈a, b〉] + [〈b, a〉] = [〈a+ b, b+ a〉] = [〈a+ b, a+ b〉] = 0. (10)
In PS, the negation operation does yield the additive inverse of an element.
The → relation on states induces a corresponding relation on processes.
If Γ,∆ ∈ P , we say that Γ → ∆ provided the process Γ − ∆ is natural (a
condition we might formally write as Γ − ∆ → 0). Intuitively, this means
that process Γ can “drive process ∆ backward”, so that Γ and the opposite
of ∆ together form a natural process.
Now, suppose that Pˆ is a collection of equivalence classes of possible pro-
cesses that is closed under addition and negation. An irreversibility function
I is a real-valued function on Pˆ such that
1. If Γ,∆ ∈ Pˆ , then I(Γ + ∆) = I(Γ) + I(∆).
2. The value of I determines the type of the processes in Pˆ :
• I(Γ) > 0 whenever Γ is natural irreversible.
• I(Γ) = 0 whenever Γ is reversible.
• I(Γ) < 0 whenever Γ is antinatural irreversible.
An irreversibility function, if it exists, has a number of elementary properties.
For instance, since the process Γ + (−Γ) is always reversible for any Γ ∈ Pˆ ,
it follows that I(−Γ) = −I(Γ). In fact, we can show that all irreversibility
functions on Pˆ are essentially the same:
Theorem 1. An irreversibility function on Pˆ is unique up to an overall
positive factor.
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Proof. Suppose I1 and I2 are irreversibility functions on the set Pˆ . If Γ is
reversible, then I1(Γ) = I2(Γ) = 0. If there are no irreversible processes in
Pˆ , then I1 = I2.
Now, suppose that Pˆ contains at least one irreversible process Γ, which
we may suppose is natural irreversible. Thus, both I1(Γ) > 0 and I2(Γ) > 0.
Consider some other process ∆ ∈ Pˆ . We must show that
I1(∆)
I1(Γ)
=
I2(∆)
I2(Γ)
. (11)
We proceed by contradiction, imagining that the two ratios are not equal
and (without loss of generality) that the second one is larger. Then, there
exists a rational number m/n (with n > 0) such that
I1(∆)
I1(Γ)
<
m
n
<
I2(∆)
I2(Γ)
. (12)
The first inequality yields mI1(Γ)−nI1(∆) > 0, so that the process mΓ−n∆
(that is, mΓ + n(−∆)) must be natural irreversible. The second inequality
yields mI2(Γ)−nI2(∆) < 0, so that the process mΓ−n∆ must be antinatural
irreversible. These cannot both be true, so the original ratios must be equal.
The additive irreversibility function I is only defined on a set Pˆ of possi-
ble processes. However, we can under some circumstances extend an additive
function to a wider domain. It is convenient to state here the general math-
ematical result we will use later for this purpose:
Theorem 2 (“Hahn–Banach theorem” for Abelian groups.). Let G be an
Abelian group. Let φ be a real-valued function defined and additive on a
subgroup G0 of G. Then, there exists an additive function φ′ defined on G
such that φ′(x) = φ(x) for all x in G0.
Note that the extension φ′ is not necessarily unique—that is, there may
be many different extensions of a single additive function φ.
5 Information and Entropy
In our theory, information resides in the distinction among possible states.
Thus, the eidostate A = {a1, a2, a3} represents information in the distinction
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among it elements. However, thermodynamic states such as the aks may
also have other properties such as energy, particle content, and so on. To
disentangle the concept of information from the other properties of these
states, we introduce a notion of a “pure” information state.
The intuitive idea is this. We imagine that the world contains freely avail-
able memory devices. Different configurations of these memories—different
memory records—are distinct states that are degenerate in energy and every
other conserved quantity. Any particular memory record can thus be freely
created from or reset to some null value.
We therefore define a record state to be an element r ∈ S such that there
exists a ∈ S so that a ↔ a + r. The state a can be thought of as part of
the apparatus that reversibly exchanges the particular record r with a null
value. In fact, if A is any eidostate at all, we find that
A+ a↔ A+ (a+ r)↔ (A+ r) + a, (13)
and so by cancellation of the singleton state a, A ↔ A + r. We denote the
set of record states by R. If r, s ∈ R, then r + s ∈ R, and furthermore
r ↔ s. Any particular record state can be reversibly transformed into any
other, a fact that expresses the arbitrariness of the “code” used to represent
information in a memory device.
An information state is an eidostate whose elements are all record states,
and the set of such eidostates is denoted I . All information states are
uniform eidostates. An information process is one that is equivalent to a
process 〈I, J〉, where I, J ∈ I . (Of course, information processes also include
processes of the form 〈I + x, J + x〉 for a non-record state x ∈ S , as well
as more complex combinations of record and non-record states.) Roughly
speaking, an information process is a kind of computation performed on
information states.
It is convenient at this point to define a bit state (denoted Ib) as an
information state containing exactly two record states. That is, Ib = {r0, r1}.
A bit process is an information process of the form Θb = 〈r, Ib〉 for some
r ∈ R—that is, a process by which a bit state is created from a single record
state.
We can illustrate a bit process in a thermodynamics context by consid-
ering a thought-experiment involving Maxwell’s demon. We imagine that
the demon operates on a one-particle gas confined to a volume, a situation
described by gas state v (see Figure 3). The demon, whose memory initially
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Figure 3: Maxwell’s demon interacting with a one-particle gas, illustrating
a bit process 〈r, {r0, r1}〉.
has a record state r, inserts a partition into the container, dividing the vol-
ume in two halves labeled 0 and 1. The gas molecule is certainly in one
sub-volume or the other. The demon then records in memory which half the
particle occupies. Finally, the partition is removed and the particle wanders
freely around the whole volume of the container. In thermodynamic terms,
the gas state relaxes to the original state v. The overall process establishes
the following relations:
v + r → {v0, v1}+ r → {v0 + r0, v1 + r1} → v + {r0, r1}, (14)
and so r → {r0, r1}. In our example, the bit process Θb = 〈r, Ib〉 is natural
one.
However, we do not yet know that there actually are information states
and information processes in our theory. We address this by a new axiom.
Axiom 5. Information: There exist a bit state and a possible bit process.
Axiom 5 has a wealth of consequences. Since an information state exists,
record states necessarily also exist. There are infinitely many record states,
since for any r ∈ R we also have distinct states r+ r, r+ (r+ r), . . . , nr, . . . ,
all in R. We may have information states in I that contain arbitrarily many
record states, because nIb contains 2
n elements. Furthermore, since every
nonempty subset of an information state is also an information state, for any
integer k ≥ 1 there exists I ∈ I so that #(I) = k.
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Any two bit states can be reversibly transformed into one another. Con-
sider Ib = {r0, r1} and I ′b = {s0, s1}. Since r0 → s0 and r1 → s1, it follows
by Axiom 4 that Ib → I ′b (and hence Ib ↔ I ′b.)
If any bit process is possible, then every bit process is possible. Fur-
thermore, every such process is of the natural irreversible type. To see why,
consider the bit state Ib = {r0, r1} and suppose Ib → r for a record state r.
Since r → r0, this implies that {r0, r1} → r0, which is a violation of Axiom 3.
Therefore, it must be that r → Ib but Ib 9 r; and this is true for any choice
of r and Ib.
Now, we can prove that every information process is possible, and that
the → relation is determined solely by the relative sizes of the initial and
final information states.
Theorem 3. Suppose I, J ∈ I . Then, I → J if and only if #(I) ≤ #(J).
Proof. To begin with, we can see that #(I) = #(J) implies I → J . This is
because we can write I = {r1, . . . , rn} and J = {s1, . . . , sn}. Since rk → sk
for every k = 1, . . . , n, the finite extension of Axiom 4 tells us that I → J .
Now, imagine that #(I) > #(J). There exists a proper subset I ′ of I so
that #(I ′) = #(J), and thus J → I ′. If it happened that I → J , it would
follow that I → I ′, a contradiction of Axiom 3. Hence, #(I) > #(J) implies
I 9 J .
It remains to show that if #(I) < #(J), it must be that I → J . As a first
case, suppose that #(I) = n and #(J) = n+1. Letting I = {r1, . . . , rn} and
J = {s1, . . . , sn, sn+1}, we note that r1 → s1, r2 → s2, . . . , rn → {sn, sn+1}
(the last being a bit process). It follows that I → J .
We now proceed inductively. Given #(J) = #(I) + n, we can imagine
a sequence of information states Km with successive numbers of elements
between #(I) and #(J), so that #(Km) = #(I) + m. From what we have
already proved,
I → K1 → · · · → Kn−1 → J, (15)
and by transitivity of the→ relation we may conclude that I → J . Therefore,
I → J if and only if #(I) ≤ #(J).
Intuitively, the greater the number of distinct record states in an infor-
mation state, the more information it represents. Thus, under our axioms,
a natural information process may maintain or increase the amount of infor-
mation, but never decrease it.
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We can sharpen this intuition considerably. Let PI be the set of infor-
mation processes, which is closed under addition and negation, and in which
every process is possible. We can define a function I on PI as follows: For
Γ = [〈I, J〉] ∈ PI ,
I(Γ) = log
(
#(J)
#(I)
)
= log #(J)− log #(I). (16)
The logarithm function guarantees the additivity of I when two processes
are combined, and the sign of I exactly determines whether I → J . Thus, I
is an irreversibility function on PI , as the notation suggests. This function
is unique up to a positive constant factor—i.e., the choice of logarithm base.
If we choose to use base-2 logarithms, so that a bit process has I(Θb) = 1,
then I is uniquely determined.
The irreversibility function on information processes can be expressed in
terms of a function on information states. Suppose we have a collection of
eidostates K ⊆ E that is closed under the + operation. With Giles, we
define a quasi-entropy on K to be a real-valued function S such that, for
A,B ∈ K :
1. S(A+B) = S(A) + S(B).
2. If 〈A,B〉 is natural irreversible, then S(A) < S(B).
3. If 〈A,B〉 is reversible, then S(A) = S(B).
(A full “entropy” function satisfies one additional requirement, which we
will address in Section 8 below.) Given a quasi-entropy S, we can derive an
irreversibility function I on possibleK -processes by I(〈A,B〉) = S(B)−S(A).
Obviously, S(I) = log #(I) is a quasi-entropy function on I that yields
the irreversibility function on PI . We recognize it as the Hartley–Shannon
entropy of an information source with #(I) possible outputs [16]. In fact,
this is the only possible quasi-entropy on I . Since every information process
is possible, two different quasi-entropy functions S and S′ can only differ by
an additive constant. However, since I + r ↔ I for I ∈ I and r ∈ R, we
know that S(r) = 0 for any quasi-entropy. Therefore, S(I) = log #(I) is the
unique quasi-entropy function for information states. The quasi-entropy of a
bit state is S(Ib) = 1.
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6 Demons
Maxwell’s demon accomplishes changes in thermodynamic states by acquir-
ing and using information. For example, a demon that operates a trapdoor
between two containers of gas can arrange for all of the gas molecules to
end up in one of the containers, “compressing” the gas without work. As we
have seen, it is also possible to imagine a reversible demon, which acquires
and manipulates information in a completely reversible way. If such a de-
mon produces a transformation from state x to state y by acquiring k bits
of information in its memory, it can accomplish the reverse transformation
(from y to x) while erasing k bits from its memory.
Maxwell’s demon is a key concept in axiomatic information thermodynamics,
and we introduce a new axiom to describe “demonic” processes.
Axiom 6. Demons: Suppose a, b ∈ S and J ∈ I such that a→ b+ J .
(a) There exists I ∈ I such that b→ a+ I.
(b) For any I ∈ I , either a→ b+ I or b+ I → a.
In Part (a), we assert that what one demon can do (transforming a to b
by acquiring information in J), another demon can undo (transforming b to
a by acquiring information in I). Part (b) envisions a reversible demon. Any
amount of information in I is either large enough that we can turn a to b by
acquiring I, or small enough that we can erase the information by turning b
to a.
A process 〈A,B〉 is said to be demonically possible if one of two equivalent
conditions hold:
• There exists an information state J ∈ I such that either A → B + J
or B → A+ J .
• There exists an information process 〈I, J〉 ∈ PI such that 〈A,B〉+〈I, J〉
is possible; that is, either A+ I → B + J or B + J → A+ I.
It is not hard to see that these are equivalent. Suppose we have J ∈ I such
that A→ B+J . Then, for any I ∈ I , A+ I → B+ (I+J). Conversely, we
note that A→ A+I for any I ∈ I . Thus, if A+I → B+J then A→ B+J
as well.
If a process is possible, then it is also demonically possible, since if A→ B
it is also true that A+ I → B + I. For singleton processes in PS, moreover,
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the converse is also true. Suppose a, b ∈ S and 〈a, b〉 is demonically possible.
Then, there exists I ∈ I such that either a → b + I or b → a + I. Either
way, either trivially or by an application of Axiom 6, there must be J ∈ I
so that a → b + J . A single record state r ∈ R is a singleton information
state in I . Thus, by Axiom 6 it must be that either a→ b+ r or b+ r → a.
Since b+ r ↔ b, we find that a
 b, and so 〈a, b〉 is possible.
A singleton process is demonically possible if and only if it is possible.
This means that we can use processes involving demons to understand pro-
cesses that do not. In fact, we can use Axiom 6 to prove a highly significant
fact about the → relation on singleton eidostates.
Theorem 4. Suppose a, b, c ∈ S . If 〈a, b〉 and 〈a, c〉 are possible, then 〈b, c〉
is possible.
Proof. First, we note the general fact that, if 〈x, y〉 is a possible singleton
process, then there exist I, J ∈ I so that x→ y + I and y → x+ J .
Given our hypothesis, therefore, there must be I, J ∈ I such that b →
a+ I and a→ c+ J . Then
b→ a+ I → c+ (I + J). (17)
That is, 〈b, c〉 is demonically possible, and hence possible.
This fact is so fundamental that Giles made it an axiom in his theory.
For us, it is a straightforward consequence of the axiom about processes
involving demons. It tells us that the set of singleton states S is partitioned
into equivalence classes, within each of which all states are related by 
.
This statement is more primitive than, but closely related to, a well-
known principle called the Comparison Hypothesis. The Comparison Hy-
pothesis deals with a state relation called adiabatic accessibility (denoted ≺)
which is definable in Giles’s theory (and ours) but is taken as an undefined
relation in some other axiomatic developments. According to the Compar-
ison Hypothesis, if X and Y are states in a given thermodynamic space,
either X ≺ Y or Y ≺ X. Lieb and Yngvason, for instance, show that the
Comparison Hypothesis can emerge as a consequence of certain axioms for
thermodynamic states, spaces, and equilibrium [2, 3].
Theorem 4 also sheds light on our axiom about conditional processes,
Axiom 4. In Part (a) of this axiom, we suppose that A→ b for some A ∈ E
and b ∈ S . The axiom itself allows us to infer that a → b for every a ∈ A.
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However, Theorem 4 now implies that, for every a, a′ ∈ A, either a → a′ or
a′ → a. In other words, Part (a) of Axiom 4, like Part (b) of the same axiom,
only applies to uniform eidostates.
Finally, we introduce one further “demonic” axiom.
Axiom 7. Stability: Suppose A,B ∈ E and J ∈ I . If nA → nB + J for
arbitrarily large values of n, then A→ B.
According to the Stability Axiom, if a demon can transform arbitrarily
many copies of eidostate A into arbitrarily many copies of B while acquiring
a bounded amount of information, then we may say that A → B. This can
be viewed as a kind of “asymptotic regularization” of the → relation. The
form of the Stability Axiom that we have chosen is a particularly simple one,
and it suffices for our purposes in this paper. However, more sophisticated
axiomatic developments might require a refinement of the axiom. Compare,
for instance, Axiom 2.1.3 in Giles to its refinement in Axiom 7.2.1 [1].
To illustrate the use of the Stability Axiom, suppose that A,B ∈ E and
I ∈ I such that A+ I → B + I. Our axioms do not provide a “cancellation
law” for information states, so we cannot immediately conclude that A→ B.
However, we can show that nA → nB + I for all positive integers n. The
case n = 1 holds since A → A + I → B + I. Now, we proceed inductively,
assuming that nA→ nB + I for some n. Then,
(n+ 1)A → nA+ A
→ (nB + I) + A
→ nB + (A+ I)
→ nB + (B + I)→ (n+ 1)B + I. (18)
Thus, nA → nB + I for arbitrarily large (and indeed all) values of n. By
the Stability Axiom, we see that A → B. Thus, there is after all a gen-
eral cancellation law information states that appear on both sides of the →
relation.
7 Irreversibility for Singleton Processes
From our two “demonic” axioms (Axioms 6 and 7), we can use the prop-
erties of information states to derive an irreversibility function on singleton
processes. Let PˆS denote the set of possible singleton processes. This is a
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subgroup of the Abelian group PS. Thus, if we can find an irreversibility
function I on PˆS, we will be able to extend it to all of PS.
We begin by proving a useful fact about possible singleton processes:
Theorem 5. Suppose a, b ∈ S so that α = 〈a, b〉 is possible. Then, for any
integers n,m ≥ 0, either a+mIb → b+ nIb or b+ nIb → a+mIb.
Proof. If m = n, the result is easy. Suppose that n > m, so that n = m+ k
for positive integer k. By Axiom 6, either a → b + kIb or b + kIb → a. We
can then append the information state mIb to both sides and rearrange the
components. The argument for m > n is exactly similar.
This fact has a corollary that we may state using the → relation on
processes. Suppose α = 〈a, b〉 is a possible singleton process, and let q, p be
integers with q > 0. Then, either qα→ pΘb or qα← pΘb (so that qα− pΘb
is either natural or antinatural) for the bit process Θb = 〈r, Ib〉.
Given α, therefore, we can define two sets of rational numbers:
Lα = {p/q : qα→ pΘb} Uα = {p/q : qα← pΘb} (19)
where q > 0. Both sets are nonempty and every rational number is in at
least one of these sets. Furthermore, if p/q ∈ Uα and p′/q′ ∈ Lα, we have
that qα← pΘb and q′α→ p′Θb, and so
pq′Θb → qq′α→ p′qΘb. (20)
Hence, (pq′ − p′q)Θb → 0. Since Θb is itself a natural irreversible process, it
follows that pq′ − p′q ≥ 0, and so
p
q
≥ p
′
q′
. (21)
Every element of Uα is an upper bound for Lα. It follows that Uα and Lα form
a Dedekind cut of the rationals, which leads us to the following important
result.
Theorem 6. For α ∈ PˆS, define I(α) = inf Uα = supLα. Then, I is an
irreversibility function on PˆS.
Proof. First, we must show that I is additive. Suppose α, β ∈ PˆS. If p/q ∈ Uα
and p′/q ∈ Uβ, then q(α + β) → (p + p′)Θb, and so (p + p′)/q ∈ Uα+β. It
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follows that I(α + β) ≤ I(α) + I(β). The corresponding argument involving
Lα and Lβ proves that I(α + β) ≥ I(α) + I(β). Thus, I must be additive.
Next, we must show that the value of I(α) tells us the type of the process
α. If I(α) > 0, then 0 ∈ Lα but 0 /∈ Uα, and so α → 0 but α 8 0. That is,
α is natural irreversible. Likewise, if I(α) < 0, then 0 /∈ Lα but 0 ∈ Uα, from
which we find that α must be antinatural irreversible. Finally, if I(α) = 0,
we find that qα−Θb → 0 and qα+ Θb ← 0 for arbitrarily large values of q.
From Axiom 7, we may conclude that α↔ 0, and so α is reversible.
Notice that we have arrived at an irreversibility function for possible
singleton processes—those most analogous to the ordinary processes in Giles
or any text on classical thermodynamics—from axioms about information
and processes involving demons (Axioms 5–7). In our view, such ideas are
not “extras” to be appended onto a thermodynamic theory, but are instead
central concepts throughout. In ordinary thermodynamics, the possibility
of a reversible heat engine can have implications for processes that do not
involve any heat engines at all. In the information thermodynamics whose
axiomatic foundations we are exploring, the possibility of a Maxwell’s demon
has implications even for situations in which no demon acts.
We now have irreversibility functions for both information processes and
singleton processes. These are closely related. In fact, it is possible to prove
the following general result:
Theorem 7. If α ∈ PˆS and Γ ∈ PI , then the combined process α + Γ is
natural if and only if I(α) + I(Γ) ≥ 0.
Since the set PˆS of possible singleton processes is a subgroup of the
Abelian group PS of all singleton processes, we can extend the additive
irreversiblity function I to all of PS. Though I is unique on the possible set
PˆS, its extension to PS is generally not unique.
8 Components of Content and Entropy
Our axiomatic theory of information thermodynamics is fundamentally about
the set of eidostates E . However, the part of that theory dealing with the set
S of singleton eidostates includes many of the concepts and results of ordi-
nary axiomatic thermodynamics [1]. We have a group of singleton processes
PS containing a subgroup PˆS of possible processes, and we have constructed
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an irreversibility function I on PˆS that may be extended to all of PS. From
these we can establish several facts.
• We can construct components of content, which are the abstract ver-
sions of conserved quantities. A component of content Q is an additive
function on S such that, if the singleton process 〈a, b〉 is possible,
then Q(a) = Q(b). (In conventional thermodynamics, components of
content include energy, particle number, etc.)
• We can find a sufficient set of components of content. The singleton
process 〈a, b〉 is possible if and only if Q(a) = Q(b) for all Q in the
sufficient set.
• We can use I to define a quasi-entropy S on S as follows: S(a) =
I(〈a, 2a〉). This is an additive function on states in S such that
I(〈a, b〉) = S(b)− S(a).
Because the extension of the irreversibility function I from PˆS to all of PS
is not unique, the quasi-entropy S is not unique either. How could various
quasi-entropies differ? Suppose I1 and I2 are two different extensions of the
same original I, leading to two quasi-entropy functions S1 and S2 on S .
Then, the difference Q = S1−S2 is a component of content. That is, if 〈a, b〉
is possible,
Q(b)−Q(a) = S1(b)− S2(b)− S1(a) + S2(a)
= I1(〈a, b〉)− I2(〈a, b〉)
= 0, (22)
since I1 and I2 agree on PˆS, which contains 〈a, b〉.
Another idea that we can inherit without alteration is the concept of
a mechanical state. A mechanical state is a singleton state that reversibly
stores one or more components of content, in much the same way that we
can store energy reversibly as the work done to lift or lower a weight. The
mechanical state in this example is the height of the weight. In Giles’s theory
[1], mechanical states are the subject of an axiom, which we also adopt:
Axiom 8. Mechanical states: There exists a subset M ⊆ S of mechanical
states such that:
(a) If l,m ∈M , then l +m ∈M .
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(a) For l,m ∈M , if l→ m then m→ l.
Nothing in this axiom asserts the actual existence of any mechanical state.
It might be that M = ∅. Furthermore, the choice of the designated set M is
not determined solely by the→ relations among the states. For instance, the
set R of record states might be included in M , or not. This explains why
the introduction of mechanical states must be phrased as an axiom, rather
than a definition: a complete specification of the system must include the
choice of which set is to be designated as M . Whatever choice is made for
M , the set PM of mechanical processes (i.e., those equivalent to 〈l,m〉 for
l,m ∈M ) will form a subgroup of PS.
A mechanical state may “reversibly store” a component of content Q,
but it need not be true that every Q can be stored like this. We say that
a component of content Q is non-mechanical if Q(m) = 0 for all m ∈ M .
For example, we might store energy by lifting or lowering a weight, but we
cannot store particle number in this way.
Once we have mechanical states and processes, we can give a new clas-
sification of processes. A process Γ ∈ P is said to be adiabatically natural
(possible, reversible, antinatural) if there exists a mechanical process µ ∈ PM
such that Γ + µ is natural (possible, reversible, antinatural). We can also
define the “adiabatic accessibility” relation for states in S , as mentioned in
Section 6: a ≺ b whenever the process 〈a, b〉 is adiabatically natural.
The set M of mechanical states allows us to refine the idea of a quasi-
entropy into an entropy, which is a quasi-entropy S that takes the value
S(m) = 0 for any mechanical state m. Such a function is guaranteed to exist.
We end up with a characterization theorem, identical to a result of Giles [1],
that summarizes the general thermodynamics of singleton eidostates in our
axiomatic theory.
Theorem 8. There exist an entropy function S and a set of components of
content Q on S with the following properties:
(a) For any a, b ∈ S , S(a+ b) = S(a) + S(b).
(b) For any a, b ∈ S and component of content Q, Q(a+ b) = Q(a) +Q(b).
(c) For any a, b ∈ S , a→ b if and only if S(a) ≤ S(b) and Q(a) = Q(b) for
every component of content Q.
(d) S(m) = 0 for all m ∈M .
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An entropy function is not unique. Two entropy functions may differ by
a non-mechanical component of content.
The entropy function on S is related to the information entropy function
we found for information states in I . Suppose we have a, b ∈ S and I, J ∈
I . Then, Theorem 7 tells us that a+ I → b+ J only if
S(a) + log #(I) ≤ S(b) + log #(J). (23)
Let E SI represent the set of eidostates that are similar to a singleton state
combined with an information state. Then, S(a+ I) = S(a) + log #(I) is an
entropy function on E SI . In the next section, we will extend the domain of
the entropy function even further, to the set U of all uniform eidostates.
9 State Equivalence
Consider a thought-experiment (illustrated in Figure 4) in which a one-
particle gas starts out in a volume v0 and a second thermodynamic system
starts out in one of three states e1, e2 or e3. We assume that all conserved
quantities are the same for these three states, but they may differ in entropy.
We can formally describe the overall situation by the eidostate E+v0, where
E = {e1, e2, e3} is uniform.
We can reversibly transform each of the ek states to the same state e,
compensating for the various changes in entropy by expanding or contracting
the volume occupied by the gas. That is, we can have v0 + ek ↔ vk + e for
adjacent but non-overlapping volumes vk. Axiom 4 indicates that we can
write E + v0 ↔ e+ V , where V = {v1, v2, v3}.
Now, we note that V can itself be reversibly transformed into a singleton
eidostate v. A gas molecule in one of the sub-volumes (eidostate V ) can be
turned into a molecule in the whole volume (eidostate e) by removing internal
partitions between the sub-volumes; and when we re-insert these partitions
the particle is once again in just one of sub-volumes. Thus, V ↔ v. To
summarize, we have
E + v0 ↔ e+ v. (24)
The uniform eidostate E, taken together with the gas state v0, can be
reversibly transformed into the singleton state v + e. We call this a state
equivalence for the uniform eidostate E. By choosing the state e properly
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Figure 4: A state equivalence thought-experiment involving states of an
arbitrary thermodynamic system and a one-particle gas.
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(say, by letting e = ek for some k), we can also guarantee that the volume v
is larger than v0, so that v0 → v by free expansion.
This discussion motivates our final axiom, which states that this type of
reversible transformation is always possible for a uniform eidostate.
Axiom 9. State equivalence: If E is a uniform eidostate then there exist
states e, x, y ∈ S such that x→ y and E + x↔ e+ y.
Axiom 9 closes a number of gaps in our theory. For example, our previous
axioms (Axioms 1–8) do not by themselves guarantee than any state in S
has a nonzero entropy. With the new axiom, however, we can prove that such
states exist. The bit state Ib, which is uniform, has some state equivalence
given by Ib +x↔ e+ y. Since the eidostates on each side of this relation are
in E SI , we can determine the entropies on each side. We find that
1 + S(x) = S(e) + S(y). (25)
It follows that at least one of the states e, x, y must have S 6= 0.
State equivalence also allows us to define the entropy of any uniform
eidostate E ∈ U . If E + x↔ e+ y then we let
S(E) = S(e) + S(y)− S(x). (26)
We must first establish that this expression is well-defined. If we have two
state equivalences for the same E, so that E+x↔ e+y and E+x′ ↔ e′+y′,
then
(e+ y) + x′ ↔ E + (x+ x′)↔ (e′ + y′) + x, (27)
from which it follows that
S(e) + S(y)− S(x) = S(e′) + S(y′)− S(x′). (28)
Thus, our definition for S(E) does not depend on our choice of state equiva-
lence for E.
Is S an entropy function on U? It is straightforward to show that S is
additive on U and that S(m) = 0 for any mechanical state m. It remains
to show that, for any E,F ∈ U with 〈E,F 〉 possible, E → F if and only
if S(E) ≤ S(F ). We will use the state equivalences E + x ↔ e + y and
F + w ↔ f + z.
Suppose first that E → F . Then, E + (x+ w)→ F + (x+ w) and so
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(e+ y) + w ↔ (E + x) + w → (F + w) + x↔ (f + z) + x. (29)
From this, it follows that
S(e) + S(y)− S(x) ≤ S(f) + S(z)− S(w), (30)
and hence S(E) ≤ S(F ).
We can actually extract one more fact from this argument. If we assume
that 〈E,F 〉 is possible, it must also be true that 〈(e+ y) + w, (f + z) + x〉 is
a possible singleton process. If we now suppose that S(E) ≤ S(F ), we know
that S((e+ y) + w) ≤ S((f + z) + x) and thus
E + (x+ w)↔ (e+ y) + w → (f + z) + x↔ F + (x+ w). (31)
Therefore, E → F , as desired.
We have extended the entropy S to uniform eidostates. It is even easier
to extend any component of content function Q to these states. If E ∈ U ,
then any e1, e2 ∈ E must have Q(e1) = Q(e2), since e1 
 e2. Thus, we can
define Q(E) = Q(ek) for any ek ∈ E. This is additive because the elements
of E + F are combinations ek + fj of states in E and F . Furthermore,
suppose we have a state equivalence E + x↔ e+ y. Since we assume x→ y
in a state equivalence, Q(x) = Q(y). By the conditional process axiom
(Axiom 4) we know that ek + x → e + y for any ek ∈ E. It follows that
Q(e) = Q(ek) = Q(E).
Now, let E1 and E2 be uniform eidostates with state equivalences Ek +
xk ↔ ek + yk. Suppose further that Q(E1) = Q(E2) for every component of
content Q. We know that Q(x1) = Q(y1), Q(x2) = Q(y2) and Q(e1) = Q(e2)
for every component of content. Thus
E1 + (x1 + x2)↔ (e1 + y1) + x2 
 (e2 + y2) + x1 ↔ E2 + (x1 + x2). (32)
It follows that E1 
 E2, i.e., that 〈E1, E2〉 is a possible eidostate process.
We have therefore extended Theorem 8 to all uniform eidostates. We
state the new result here.
Theorem 9 (Uniform eidostate thermodynamics). There exist an entropy
function S and a set of components of content Q on U with the following
properties:
(a) For any E,F ∈ U , S(E + F ) = S(E) + S(F ).
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(b) For any E,F ∈ U and component of content Q, Q(E + F ) = Q(E) +
Q(F ).
(c) For any E,F ∈ U , E → F if and only if S(E) ≤ S(F ) and Q(E) = Q(F )
for every component of content Q.
(d) S(m) = 0 for all m ∈M .
The set U of uniform eidostates includes the singleton states in S , the
information states in I , all combinations of these, and perhaps many other
states as well. (Non-uniform eidostates in E might exist, as we will see in the
model we discuss in Section 12, but their existence cannot be proved from
our axioms.) The type of every process involving uniform eidostates can be
determined by a single entropy function (which must not decrease) and a set
of components of content (which must be conserved).
10 Entropy for Uniform Eidostates
We have extended the entropy function from singleton states and information
states to all uniform eidostates. It turns out that this extension is unique.
The following theorem and its corollaries actually allow us to compute the
entropy of any E ∈ U from the entropies of the states contained in E.
Theorem 10. Suppose E ∈ U is a disjoint union of uniform eidostates E1
and E2. Then
S(E) = S(E1 ∪ E2) = log
(
2S(E1) + 2S(E2)
)
. (33)
Proof. E and Ek (k = 1, 2) all have equal components of content. Define
∆(E1, E2) = S(E)− log
(
2S(E1) + 2S(E2)
)
. (34)
Note that, if we replace Ek by E
′
k = Ek + I for I ∈ I , then these new
eidostates are still disjoint and
E ′ = E ′1 ∪ E ′2 = (E1 + I) ∪ (E2 + I) = (E + I) . (35)
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These eidostates have the same components of content as the original E.
Furthermore,
∆(E ′1, E
′
2) = ∆(E1 + I, E2 + I)
= S(E + I)− log (2S(E1+I) + 2S(E2+I))
= S(E) + log #(I)− log (2log#(I) (2S(E1) + 2S(E2)))
= ∆(E1, E2). (36)
We can find a uniform eidostate E0 with the same components of content
such that S0 = S(E0) is less than or equal to S(E1), S(E2) and S(E). (It
suffices to pick E0 to be the state of smallest entropy among E1, E2 and E.)
Then, there exist integers mk ≥ 1 such that
• There are disjoint information states Jk containing mk record states.
• There are disjoint information states J∗k containing mk+1 record states.
• J = J1 ∪ J2 and J∗ = J∗1 ∪ J∗2 have m1 + m2 and m1 + m2 + 2 record
states, respectively.
• We have
S0 + logmk ≤ S(Ek) < S0 + log(mk + 1). (37)
That is, we choose mk so that S(Ek) − S0 ≥ 0 is between log(mk) and
log(mk + 1). To put it more simply, mk = b2S(Ek)−S0c.
Once we have mk, we can write that
2S0 ·mk ≤ 2S(Ek) < 2S0 · (mk + 1). (38)
Adding these inequalities for k = 1, 2 and taking the logarithm yields
S0 + log(m1 +m2) ≤ log
(
2S(E1) + 2S(E2)
)
< S0 + log(m1 +m2 + 2). (39)
How far apart are the two ends of this chain of inequalities? Here, is a useful
fact about base-2 logarithms: If n ≥ 1, then log(n+ 2) < log(n) + 2/n. This
implies
S0 + log(m1 +m2) ≤ log
(
2S(E1) + 2S(E2)
)
< S0 + log(m1 +m2) +
2
m1 +m2
.
(40)
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The two ends of the inequality differ by less than 2/(m1 +m2).
We can get another chain of inequalities by applying Axiom 4 about
conditional processes. Since all of our uniform eidostates have the same
components of content, we know that
E0 + Jk → Ek → E0 + J∗k . (41)
From the axiom, we can therefore say
E0 + J → E → E0 + J∗ (42)
which implies that
S0 + log(m1 +m2) ≤ S(E) ≤ S0 + log(m1 +m2 + 2)
< S0 + log(m1 +m2) +
2
m1 +m2
. (43)
We have two quantities that lie in the same interval. Their separation is
therefore bounded by the interval width—i.e., less than 2/(m1 +m2). There-
fore,
|∆(E1, E2)| =
∣∣S(E)− log (2S(E1) + 2S(E2))∣∣
<
2
m1 +m2
. (44)
How big are the numbers mk? We can make such numbers as large as
we like by considering instead the eidostates E ′k = Ek + I, where I is an
information state. As we have seen, ∆(E ′1, E
′
2) = ∆(E1, E2). Given any
 > 0, we can choose I so that
m′k =
⌊
2S(E
′
k)−S0
⌋
=
⌊
#(I) · 2S(Ek)−S0⌋ > 1

. (45)
Then, 2/(m′1 +m
′
2) < , and so
|∆(E1, E2)| = |∆(E ′1, E ′2)| < . (46)
Since this is true for any  > 0, we must have ∆(E1, E2) = 0, and so
S(E) = log
(
2S(E1) + 2S(E2)
)
, (47)
as desired.
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Theorem 10 has a corollary, which we obtain by applying the theorem
inductively:
Theorem 11. If E is a uniform eidostate,
S(E) = log
(∑
ek∈E
2S(ek)
)
. (48)
The entropy of any uniform eidostate is a straightforward function of the
entropies of the states contained therein. If E contains more than one state,
we notice that S(E) > S(ek) for any ek ∈ E. It follows that 〈ek, E〉 is a
natural irreversible process.
To take a simple example of Theorem 11, consider the entropy of an
information state. Every record state r has S(r) = 0. Thus, for I ∈ I ,
S(I) = log
(∑
rk∈I
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)
= log #(I), (49)
as we have already seen.
11 Probability
An eidostate in E represents a state of knowledge of a thermodynamic agent.
It is, as we have said, a simple list of possible states, without any assignment
of probabilities to them. If the agent is to use probabilistic reasoning, then it
needs to assign conditional probabilities of the form P (A|B) where A,B ∈ E .
The entropy formula in Theorem 11 allows us to make such an assign-
ment based on the entropy itself, provided the eidostate conditioned upon is
uniform. Suppose E ∈ U and let a ∈ S . Then, the entropic probability of a
conditioned on E is
P (a|E) =

2S(a)
2S(E)
= 2S(a)−S(E) a ∈ E
0 a /∈ E
. (50)
Clearly, 0 ≤ P (a|E) ≤ 1 and
∑
a
P (a|E) = 1. It is worth noting that,
although E is “uniform” (in the sense that all a ∈ E have exactly the same
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conserved components of content), the probability distribution P (a|E) is not
uniform, but assigns a higher probability to states of higher entropy.
We can generalize entropic probabilities a bit further. Let A be any subset
of S (be it an eidostate or not) and E ∈ U . Then, A∩E is either a uniform
eidostate or the empty set ∅. If we formally assign S(∅) = −∞, then both E
and A ∩ E have well-defined entropies. Then, we define
p(A|E) =
∑
a∈A
P (a|E) = 2
S(A∩E)
2S(E)
= 2S(A∩E)−S(E). (51)
Obviously, P (E|E) = 1. Now, consider two disjoint sets A and B along with
E ∈ U . The set (A ∪ B) ∩ E is a disjoint union of uniform eidostates (or
empty sets) A ∩ E and B ∩ E. Thus,
P (A ∪B|E) = 2
S((A∪B)∩E)
2S(E)
=
2S(A∩E) + 2S(B∩E)
2S(E)
= P (A|E) + P (B|E), (52)
in accordance with the rules of probability. We also have the usual rule for
conditional probabilities. Suppose A,B ⊆ S and E ∈ U such that A∩E 6= ∅.
Then
P (B|A ∩ E) = 2
S(B∩(A∩E))
2S(A∩E)
=
P (B ∩ A|E)
P (A|E) . (53)
The entropy formula in Theorem 11 and the probability assignment in
Equation 50 call to mind familiar ideas from statistical mechanics. According
to Boltzmann’s formula, the entropy is S = log Ω, where Ω is (depending on
the context) the number (or phase space volume or Hilbert space dimension)
of the microstates consistent with macroscopic data about a system. In the
microcanonical ensemble, a uniform probability distribution is assigned to
these microstates. In an eidostate E comprising non-overlapping macrostates
states {e1, e2, . . .}, we would therefore expect Ω(E) = Ω(e1) + Ω(e2) + . . .,
and the probability of state ek should be proportional to Ω(ek). However, in
our axiomatic system Theorem 11 and Equation (50) do not arise from any
assumptions about microstates, but solely from the “phenomenological” →
relation among eidostates in E .
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Even though the entropy function S is not unique, the entropic probability
assignment is unique. Suppose S1 and S2 are two entropy functions for the
same states and processes. Then, as we have seen, the difference S1 − S2 is
a component of content. All of the states within a uniform eidostate E (as
well as E itself) have the same values for all components of content. That
is, S1(a)− S2(a) = S1(E)− S2(E) for any a ∈ E. Thus,
P1(a|E) = 2S1(a)−S1(E) = 2S2(a)−S2(E) = P2(a|E). (54)
(Both probabilities are zero for a /∈ E, of course.)
The entropic probability assignment is not the only possible probability
assignment, but it does have a number of remarkable properties. For in-
stance, suppose E and F are two uniform eidostates. If we prepare them
independently, we have the combined eidostate E+F and the probability of
some particular state x+ y is
P (x+ y|E + F ) = 2
S(x)+S(y)
2S(E)+S(F )
= P (x|E)P (y|F ), (55)
as we would expect for independent events.
The entropic probability also yields an elegant expression for the entropy
S(E) of a uniform eidostate E.
Theorem 12. Suppose E is a uniform eidostate, and P (a|E) is the entropic
probability for state a ∈ E. Then
S(E) =
〈
S(a)
〉
+H(~P ), (56)
where 〈S(a)〉 is the average state entropy in E and H(~P ) is the Shannon
entropy of the P (a|E) distribution.
Proof. We first note that, for any a ∈ E, logP (a|E) = S(a) − S(E). We
rewrite this as S(E) = S(a) − logP (a|E) and take the mean value with
respect to the P (a|E) probabilities:
S(E) = 〈S(E)〉
=
∑
a∈E
P (a|E) (S(a)− logP (a|E))
=
∑
a∈E
P (a|E)S(a)−
∑
a∈E
P (a|E) logP (a|E), (57)
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Therefore, S(E) = 〈S(a)〉+H(~P ), as desired.
We previously said that the list of possible states in an eidostate repre-
sents a kind of information. Theorem 12 puts this intuition on a quantitative
footing. The entropy of a uniform eidostate E can be decomposed into two
parts: the average entropy of the states, and an additional term representing
the information contained in the distinction among the possible states. For
a singleton state, the entropy is all of the first sort. For a pure information
state I ∈ I , it is all of the second.
In fact, the decomposition itself uniquely picks out the entropic probabil-
ity assignment. Suppose P (a|E) is the entropic probability of a given E, and
P ′(a|E) is some other probability distribution over states in E. By Gibbs’s
inequality [17],
0 ≤
∑
a∈E
P ′(a|E) log
(
P ′(a|E)
P (a|E)
)
(58)
with equality if and only if P ′(a|E) = P (a|E) for all a ∈ E. We find that
0 ≤
∑
a∈E
P ′(a|E) log
(
P ′(a|E) 2S(E)
2S(a)
)
=
∑
a∈E
P ′(a|E) logP ′(a|E) + S(E) −
∑
a∈E
P ′(a|E)S(a) (59)
and so
S(E) ≥
〈
S(a)
〉
P ′
+H(~P ′), (60)
with equality if and only if the P ′ distribution is the entropic one.
An agent that employs entropic probabilities will regard the entropy of a
uniform eidostate E as the sum of two parts, one the average entropy of the
possible states and the other the Shannon entropy of the distribution. For
an agent that employs some other probability distribution, things will not be
so simple. Besides the average state entropy and the Shannon entropy of the
distribution, S(E) will include an extra, otherwise unexplained term. Thus,
for a given collection of eidostates connected by the → relation, the entropic
probability provides a uniquely simple account of the entropy of any uniform
eidostate.
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It is in this sense we say that the entropic probability “emerges” from the
entropy function S, just as that function itself emerges from the → relation
among eidostates.
Some further remarks about probability are in order. Every formal basis
for probability emphasizes a distinct idea about it. In Kolmogorov’s axioms
[18], probability is simply a measure on a sample space. High-measure subsets
are more probable. In the Bayesian approach of Cox [19], probability is a
rational measure of confidence in a proposition. Propositions in which a
rational agent is more confident are also more probable. Laplace’s early
discussion [20] is based on symmetry. Symmetrically equivalent events—
two different orderings of a shuffled deck of cards, for instance—are equally
probable. (Zurek [21] has used a similar principle of “envariance” to discuss
the origin of quantum probabilities.) In algorithmic information theory [16],
the algorithmic probability of a bit string is related to its complexity. Simpler
bit strings are more probable.
In a similar way, entropic probabilities express facts about state transfor-
mations. In a uniform eidostate E, any two states a, b ∈ E are related by a
possible process. If a → b, then the output state is at least as probable as
the input state: P (a|E) ≤ P (b|E).
12 A Model for the Axioms
A model for an axiomatic system may serve several purposes. The existence
of a model establishes that the axioms are self-consistent. A model may also
demonstrate that the system can describe an actual realistic physical situa-
tion. If the axioms have a variety of interesting models, then the axiomatic
theory is widely applicable. We may almost say that the entire significance
of an axiomatic system lies in the range of models for that system.
Terms that are undefined in an abstract axiomatic system are defined
within a model as particular mathematical structures. The axioms of the
system are provable properties of those structures. Therefore, a model for
axiomatic information thermodynamics must include several elements:
• A set S of states and a collection E of finite nonempty subsets of S
to be designated as eidostates.
• A rule for interpreting the combination of states (+) in S .
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Figure 5: Atomic states in our simple “macrostate” model.
• A relation → on E .
• A designated setM ⊆ S of mechanical states (which might be empty).
• Proofs of Axioms 1–9 within the model, including the general properties
of →, the existence of record states and information states, etc.
The model will therefore involve specific meanings for S , E , +, → and
so forth. It will also yield interpretations of derived concepts and results,
such as entropy functions and conserved components of content. In the ab-
stract theory, the combination a+ b is simply the Cartesian pair (a, b). This
definition may suffice for the model, or the model may have a different inter-
pretation of +. In any case, it must be true in the model that a+ b = a′+ b′
implies a = a′ and b = b′.
Our first model for axiomatic thermodynamics is based on a set A of
“atomic” states, from which all states in S and all eidostates in E are
constructed. We assign entropies and components of content to these states,
which extend to composite states by additivity. Let us consider a simple but
non-trivial example that has just one component of content Q. A suitable set
A of atomic states is shown in Figure 5. It includes a special state r (with
S(r) = 0 and Q(r) = 0) and a continuous set of states sλ with Q(sλ) = 1
and S(sλ) = λ. The parameter λ ranges over the closed interval [0, 1]. The
set of states S includes everything that can be constructed from A by finite
application of the pairing operation. In this way, we can build up a ∈ S
with any non-negative integer value of the component of content Q(a) and
any entropy value 0 ≤ S(a) ≤ Q(a). Indeed, there will typically be many
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different ways to create given (Q,S) values. To obtain Q(a) = 2 and S(a) = 1,
for example, we might have a = s1 + s0, s0 + s1, (s1/2 + s1/2) + r, . . ..
Anticipating somewhat, we call an eidostate uniform if all of its elements
have the same Q-value. We calculate the entropy of a uniform eidostate by
applying Theorem 11 to it.
Our model allows any finite nonempty set of states to play the role of an
eidostate. Hence, we have both uniform and non-uniform eidostates in E .
Each eidostate A has a finite Cartesian factorization
A = FA(E1, . . . , En). (61)
If A is uniform, then all of its factors are also uniform. If none of its factors
are uniform, we say that A is completely non-uniform. More generally, we
can write down an NU-decomposition for any eidostate A:
A ∼ NA + UA, (62)
where NA is a completely non-uniform eidostate and UA is a uniform ei-
dostate. Of course, if A itself is either completely non-uniform or uniform,
one or the other of these eidostates may be absent from the decomposition.
The NU-decomposition is unique up to similarity: If NA+UA ∼ N ′A+U ′A for
completely non-uniform Ns and uniform Us, then NA ∼ N ′A and UA ∼ U ′A.
We can now define the → relation on E in our model. If A,B ∈ E , we
first write down NU-decompositions A ∼ NA + UA and B ∼ NB + UB. We
say that A→ B provided three conditions hold:
1. Either NA and NB both do not exist, or NA ∼ NB.
2. Either UA and UB both do not exist, or only one exists and its Q-value
is 0, or both exist and Q(UA) = Q(UB).
3. Either UA and UB both do not exist, or only UA exists and S(UA) = 0,
or only UB exists and S(UB) ≥ 0, or both exist and S(UA) ≤ S(UB).
We may call these the N -criterion, Q-criterion, and S-criterion, and summa-
rize their meaning as follows: A→ B provided we can transform A to B by:
(a) rearranging the non-uniform factors; and (b) transforming the uniform
factors in a way that conserves Q and does not decrease S.
Now, let us examine each of the axioms in turn.
Axiom 1 The basic properties of eidostates follow by construction.
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Axiom 2 Part (a) holds because A ∼ B implies that A and B can have the
same NU-decomposition. Part (b) holds because similarity, equality
(for Q) and inequality (for S) are all transitive. Parts (c) and (d) make
use of the general facts that NA+B ∼ NA +NB and UA+B ∼ UA + UB.
Axiom 3 If NA 6∼ NB, then A9 B. If NA ∼ NB, then it must be true that
UB ( UA, and so S(UA) > S(UB). The S-criterion fails, so A 9 B in
this case as well.
Axiom 4 For Part (a), we note that A must be uniform, and so A′ ⊆ A is
also uniform. The statement follows from the S-criterion. Part (b) also
follows from the S-criterion.
Axiom 5 The atomic state r with Q(r) = 0 and S(r) = 0 is a record state,
as is r + r, etc. We can take our bit state to be Ib = {r, r + r}.
Since every information state I ∈ I is uniform with Q(I) = 0, every
information process (including Θb = 〈r, Ib〉) is possible.
Axiom 6 Since all of the states of the form a+I are uniform, the statements
in this axiom follow from the S-criterion.
Axiom 7 Suppose nA → nB + J . Since J is uniform, it must be that
nNA ∼ nNB, from which it follows that NA ∼ NB. The S-criterion
for UA and UB follows from a typical stability argument—that is, if
nx ≤ ny + z for arbitrarily large values of n, then it must be true
x ≤ y.
Axiom 8 The set M of mechanical states may be defined to include all
states that can be constructed from the zero-entropy atomic state s0
(such as s0+s0, s0+(s0+s0), etc.). The required properties ofM follow.
Axiom 9 The uniform eidostate E has Q(E) = q ≥ 0 and S(E) = σ ≥ 0.
Choose an integer n > σ. Now, let e = qs0 (or e = r if q = 0), x = ns0,
and y = nsλ where λ = σ/n. We find that Q(e) = q, Q(x) = Q(y) = n,
S(e) = S(x) = 0 and S(y) = n(σ/n) = σ. It follows that x → y and
E + x↔ e+ y.
This model based on a simple set of atomic states has several sophisticated
characteristics, including a non-trivial component of content Q and possible
processes involving non-uniform eidostates. It is not difficult to create models
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of this type that are even richer and more complex. However, it may be
objected that this type of model obscures one of the key features of axiomatic
information thermodynamics. Here, the entropy function S does not emerge
from the → relation among eidostates, but instead is imposed by hand to
define → within the model. We address this deficiency in our next model.
13 A Simple Quantum Model
Now, we present a model for the axioms in which the entropy function does
emerge from the underlying structure. The model is a simple one without
mechanical states or non-trivial components of content. Every eidostate is
uniform and every process is possible. On the other hand, the model is based
on quantum mechanics, and so is not devoid of features of interest.
Consider an agent A that can act upon an external qubit system Q having
Hilbert space Q. Based on the information the agent possesses, it may assign
the states |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉 to the qubit. These state vectors need not be orthog-
onal. That is, it may be that no measurement of Q can perfectly distinguish
which of the two states is actually present. The states, however, correspond
to states of knowledge of agent A, and the agent is able to perform different
operations on Q depending on whether it judges the qubit to be in one state
or the other. Our notion of information possessed by the agent is thus similar
to Zurek’s concept of actionable information [22]. Roughly speaking, infor-
mation is actionable if it can be used as a control variable for conditional
unitary dynamics. This means that the two states of the agent’s memory
(|µ1〉 and |µ2〉 in a Hilbert space A) must be distinguishable. Hence, if we
include the agent in our description of the entire system, the states |µ1〉⊗|ψ1〉
and |µ2〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉 are orthogonal, even if |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are not.
Our model for axiomatic information thermodynamics envisions a world
consisting of an agent A and an unbounded number of external qubits. Noth-
ing essential in our model would be altered if the external systems had
dimQ = d —“qudits” instead of qubits. The thermodynamic states of the
qubit systems are actually states of knowledge of the agent, and so we must
include the corresponding state of the agent’s memory in our physical de-
scription. The quantum state space for our model is of the form:
H = A⊗Q⊗Q⊗ · · · (63)
To be a bit more rigorous, we restrictH to vectors of the form |Ψ〉⊗|0〉⊗|0〉⊗
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· · · , where |Ψ〉 ∈ A ⊗ Q⊗n for some finite n, and |0〉 is a designated “zero”
ket in Q. Physical states in H have 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1. (The space H is not quite a
Hilbert space, since it is not topologically complete, but this mathematical
nicety will not affect our discussion.)
Since the Qs are qubits, dimQ = 2. The agent space A, however, must be
infinite-dimensional, so that it contains a countably infinite set of orthogonal
quantum states. These are to be identified as distinct records of the agent’s
memory.
In our thermodynamic model, the elements of S (the thermodynamic
“states”) are projection operators onH. For any a ∈ S , we have a projection
on H of the form
Πa = |a〉〈a| ⊗ pia ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ · · · (64)
where |a〉 is an agent state in A and pia is a non-null projection in Q⊗n
for some finite n ≥ 1. The value of n is determined by a specified integer
function L(a), which we call the length of the state a. Heuristically, the
thermodynamic state a means that the state of the world lies in the subspace
Sa onto which Πa projects. The agent’s memory is in the state |a〉 and the
the quantum state of the first L(a) external qubits lies somewhere in the
subspace onto which pia projects. (All of the subsequent qubits are in the
state |0〉.)
Two distinct thermodynamic states correspond to orthogonal states of
the agent’s memory. If a, b ∈ S with a 6= b, then 〈a|b〉 = 0. The projections
Πa and Πb are orthogonal to each other (so that ΠaΠb = 0). However, it
need not be the case that pia and pib are orthogonal.
Given a, the projection Πa projects onto the subspace Sa The dimension
of this subspace is da = dimSa = Tr Πa = Trpia. Note that da ≤ 2L(a). We
will assume that there are Sa subspaces of every finite dimension: For any
integer n ≥ 1, there exists a ∈ S with da = n.
Suppose a, b ∈ S correspond to Πa = |a〉〈a| ⊗pia⊗ · · · and Πb = |b〉〈b| ⊗
pib⊗ · · · . Then, we will specify that the combined state a+ b corresponds to
Πa+b = |a+ b〉〈a+ b| ⊗ pia ⊗ pib ⊗ · · · . (65)
Since the state a + b entails a distinct state of the agent’s knowledge, the
agent state vector |a+ b〉 is orthogonal to both |a〉 and |b〉. We also note
that L(a+ b) = L(a) + L(b).
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Here is a clarifying example. Suppose a, b, c ∈ S . Then,
Π(a+b)+c = |(a+ b) + c〉〈(a+ b) + c| ⊗ pia ⊗ pib ⊗ pic ⊗ · · · (66)
Πa+(b+c) = |a+ (b+ c)〉〈a+ (b+ c)| ⊗ pia ⊗ pib ⊗ pic ⊗ · · · (67)
are distinct thermodynamic states and hence orthogonal projections in H,
even though they correspond to exactly the same qubit states. The difference
between (a+ b) + c and a+ (b+ c) entirely lies in the distinct representations
of the states in the agent’s memory.
The eidostates in our model are the finite nonempty collections of states
in S . We can associate each eidostate with a projection operator as well.
Let E = {a, . . .} be an eidostate. We define
ΠE =
∑
a∈E
Πa =
∑
a∈E
|a〉〈a| ⊗ pia ⊗ · · · . (68)
This is a projection operator because the Πa projections are orthogonal to
one another. ΠE projects onto a subspace SE, which is the linear span of
the collection of subspaces {Sa, . . .}.
Interestingly, this subspace SE might contain quantum states in which
the agent A is entangled with one or more external qubits. Suppose a, b ∈ S
are associated with single-qubit projections onto distinct states |ψa〉 and |ψb〉.
The eidostate E = {a, b} is associated with the projection
ΠE = (|a〉〈a| ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa|+ |b〉〈b| ⊗ |ψb〉〈ψb|)⊗ · · · , (69)
which projects onto a subspace SE that contains the quantum state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉 ⊗ |ψa〉+ |b〉 ⊗ |ψb〉)⊗ · · · . (70)
In this state, the agent does not have a definite memory record state. How-
ever, if a measurement is performed on the agent (perhaps by asking it a
question), then the resulting memory record a or b would certainly be found
to be consistent with the state of the qubit system, |ψa〉 or |ψb〉.
Suppose we combine two eidostates A = {a, . . .} and B = {b, . . .}. Then,
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the quantum state lies in a subspace of dimension
dA+B = Tr ΠA+B = Tr
∑
a,b
Πa+b
=
∑
a,b
Tr (|a+ b〉〈a+ b| ⊗ pia ⊗ pib)
=
∑
a,b
(Trpia) (Trpib)
=
(∑
a
Trpia
)(∑
b
Trpib
)
= dA · dB. (71)
When eidostates combine, subspace dimension is multiplicative.
It remains to define the → relation in our quantum model. We say that
A → B if there exists a unitary time evolution operator U on H such that
|Ψ〉 ∈ SA implies that U |Ψ〉 ∈ SB. That is, every quantum state consistent
with A evolves to one consistent with B under the time evolution U . (Note
that the evolution includes a suitable updating of the agent’s own memory
state.) This requirement is easily expressed as a subspace dimension criterion:
A→ B if and only if dA ≤ dB.
We are now ready to verify our axioms.
Axiom 1 This follows from our construction of the eidostates E .
Axiom 2 All of these basic properties of the → relation follow from the
subspace dimension criterion.
Axiom 3 If B ( A, then dA > dB, and so A9 B.
Axiom 4 Again, both parts of this axiom follow from the subspace dimen-
sion criterion. If eidostate A is a disjoint union of eidostates A1 and
A2, then dA = dA1 + dA2 .
Axiom 5 Any state r with dr = 1 functions as a record state. We have
assumed that such a state exists. We can take Ib = {r, r + r}. The
bit process Θb = 〈r, Ib〉 is natural (r → Ib) by the subspace dimension
criterion. Notice that, for any information state I, dI = #(I).
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Axiom 6 For any b ∈ S and I ∈ I , we have db+I = db · #(I). For
Part (a), we can always find a large enough information state so that
db ≤ da ·#(I). For Part (b), either da ≤ db+I or db+I ≤ da.
Axiom 7 If (dA)
n ≤ (dB)n · #(J) for arbitrarily large values of n, then
dA ≤ dB.
Axiom 8 It is consistent to take M = ∅.
Axiom 9 All of our eidostates are uniform. For any eidostate E, we can
choose e so that de = dE. (Recall that we have assumed states with
every positive subspace dimension.) If we chose x = y to be any state,
then E + x↔ e+ y.
Our quantum mechanical model is therefore a model of the axioms of in-
formation thermodynamics. It is a relatively simple model, of course, having
no non-trivial conserved components of content and no mechanical states.
In the quantum model, the entropy of any eidostate is simply the loga-
rithm of the dimension of the corresponding subspace: S(E) = log dE. This
is the von Neumann entropy of a uniform density operator ρE =
1
dE
ΠE. We
can, in fact, recast our entire discussion in terms of these mixed states, and
this approach does yield some insights. For example, we find that the den-
sity operator ρE for eidostate E is a mixture of the density operators for its
constituent states:
ρE =
∑
a∈E
P (a|E)ρa, (72)
where P (a|E) is the entropic probability
P (a|E) = 2
S(a)
2S(E)
=
da
dE
. (73)
There are, of course, many quantum states of the agent and its qubit world
that do not lie within any eidostate subspace SE. For example, consider a
state associated with a pure state projection Πa = |a〉〈a| ⊗ |ψa〉〈ψa| ⊗ · · · .
Let |χ〉 be a state orthogonal to |ψa〉. Then, |a〉 ⊗ |χ〉 ⊗ · · · is a perfectly
legitimate quantum state that is orthogonal to Sa and every other eidostate
subspace. This state represents a situation in which the agent’s memory
record indicates that the first L(a) external qubits are in state |ψa〉, but the
agent is wrong.
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The exclusion of such physically possible but incongruous quantum states
tells us something significant about our theory of axiomatic information
thermodynamics. The set E does not necessarily include all possible physical
situations; the arrow relations→ between eidostates do not necessarily repre-
sent all possible time evolutions. Our axiomatic system is simply a theory of
what transformations are possible among a collection of allowable states. In
this, it is similar to ordinary classical thermodynamics, which is designed to
consider processes that begin and end with states in internal thermodynamic
equilibrium.
14 Remarks
The emergence of the entropy S, a state function that determines the ir-
reversibility of processes, is a key benchmark for any axiomatic system of
thermodynamics. Our axiomatic system does not yield a unique entropy on
S , since it is based on the extension of an irreversibility function to impos-
sible processes. However, many of our results and formulas for entropy are
uniquely determined by our axioms. The entropy measure for information
states, the Hartley–Shannon entropy log #(I), is unique up to the choice of
logarithm base. This in turn uniquely determines the irreversibility function
on possible singleton processes, since this is defined in terms of the creation
and erasure of bit states. There is a unique relationship between the entropy
of a uniform eidostate and the entropy of the possible states it contains.
Finally, the entropic probability distribution on a uniform eidostate, which
might appear at first to depend on the singleton state entropy, is nonetheless
unique.
It remains to be seen how the axiomatic system developed here for state
transformations is related to the axiomatic system, similar in some respects,
given by Knuth and Skilling for considering problems of inference [23]. There,
symmetry axioms in a lattice of states give rise to probability and entropy
measures. In a similar way, the ”entropy first, probability after” idea pre-
sented here is reminiscent of Caticha’s ”entropic inference” [24], in which the
probabilistic Bayes rule is derived (along with the maximum entropy method)
from a single relative entropy functional.
The entropy in information thermodynamics has two aspects: a measure
of the information in a pure information state and an irreversibility measure
for a singleton eidostate (the kind most closely analogous to a conventional
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thermodynamic state). The most general expression for the entropy of a
uniform eidostate in Theorem 12 exhibits this twofold character. However,
the two aspects of entropy are not really distinct in our axiomatic system.
Both are based on the structure of the → relation among eidostates, which
tells how one eidostate may be transformed into another by processes that
may include demons.
The connection between information and thermodynamic entropy is nowhere
more clearly stated than in Landauer’s principle, the minimum thermody-
namic cost of information erasure. It is easy to state a theorem of our system
corresponding to Landauer’s principle. Suppose a, b ∈ S and Ib is a bit state.
If a + Ib → b, then it follows that S(b) ≥ S(a) + 1. Erasing a bit state is
necessarily accompanied by an increase of at least one unit in the thermo-
dynamic entropy. More generally, suppose A and B are uniform eidostates
with A → B. If we use Theorem 12 to write the entropies of the two states
as
S(A) = 〈S〉A +HA and S(B) = 〈S〉B +HB, (74)
then it follows that ∆〈S〉 ≥ −∆H for the process taking A to B. In other
words, any decrease of the “Shannon information” part of the eidostate en-
tropy (−∆H) must be accompanied by an increase, on average, in the ther-
modynamic entropy of the possible states (∆〈S〉).
These theorems do not really constitute a “proof” of Landauer’s princi-
ple, because they depend upon the physical applicability of our axioms. On
the other hand, our axiomatic framework does obviate some of the objec-
tions that have been raised to existing derivations of Landauer’s principle.
Norton [25], for example, has argued that many “proofs” of the principle im-
properly mix together two different kinds of probability distribution, the mi-
crostate distributions associated with thermodynamic equilibrium states and
the probability assignments to memory records that represent information.
He calls this the problem of “illicit ensembles”. Our approach, by contrast, is
not based on concepts of probability, except for those that emerge naturally
from the structure of the → relation. We do not resolve thermodynamic
states into their microstates at all, and we represent information by a simple
enumeration of possible memory records.
The Second Law of Thermodynamics, the law of non-decrease of entropy,
is the canonical example of the “arrow of time” in physics. Time asymmetry
in our axiomatic theory is found in the direction of the → relation. It is an
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enlightening exercise to consider the axioms of information thermodynamics
with the arrows reversed. Some axioms (e.g., Axioms 1 and 2) are actually
unchanged by this. Others may be modified but still remain true statements
in the theory. A few become false. The most striking example of the last is
Axiom 3, which states that no eidostate may be transformed into a proper
subset of itself. That is, no process can deterministically delete one of a
list of possible states. This is the principle that leads to irreversbility in
information processes, and through them, to more general irreversibility and
entropy measures.
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Appendix
This appendix provides a convenient summary of axioms of our theory.
First, we remind ourselves of a few essential definitions:
An eidostate is a set whose elements are called states . The collection
of eidostates is E and the collection of states is S . An element a ∈ S may
be identified with the singleton eidostate {a} ∈ E .
Eidostates are combined by the Cartesian product, which we denote by
the symbol +. When we combine an eidostate with itself n times, we use nA
to denote A+ (A+ (A+ . . .)). Two eidostates are similar (written A ∼ B)
if they are made up of the same Cartesian factors, perhaps combined in a
different way.
There is a relation → on E , and thus also on the singletons in S . An
eidostate A is uniform if, for all a, b ∈ A, either a → b or b → a. A
formal process is a pair of eidostates 〈A,B〉. We say that a process 〈A,B〉
is possible if either A→ B or B → A.
A record state r is a state for which there exists another state a such
that a→ a+r and a+r → a (denoted a↔ a+r). An information state is
an eidostate containing only record states, and the set of information states
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is called I . A bit state Ib is an information state containing exactly two
distinct record states. A bit process is a formal process 〈r, Ib〉, where r is
a record state and Ib is a bit state.
Now, we may state our axioms:
Axiom 1 (Eidostates.) E is a collection of sets called eidostates such that:
(a) Every A ∈ E is a finite nonempty set with a finite prime Cartesian
factorization.
(b) A+B ∈ E if and only if A,B ∈ E .
(c) Every nonempty subset of an eidostate is also an eidostate.
Axiom 2 (Processes.) Let eidostates A,B,C ∈ E , and s ∈ S .
(a) If A ∼ B, then A→ B.
(b) If A→ B and B → C, then A→ C.
(c) If A→ B, then A+ C → B + C.
(d) If A+ s→ B + s, then A→ B.
Axiom 3 If A,B ∈ E and B is a proper subset of A, then A9 B.
Axiom 4 (Conditional processes.)
(a) Suppose A,A′ ∈ E and b ∈ S . If A→ b and A′ ⊆ A then A′ → b.
(b) Suppose A and B are uniform eidostates that are each disjoint
unions of eidostates: A = A1 ∪ A2 and B = B1 ∪ B2. If A1 → B1
and A2 → B2 then A→ B.
Axiom 5 (Information.) There exist a bit state and a possible bit process.
Axiom 6 (Demons.) Suppose a, b ∈ S and J ∈ I such that a→ b+ J .
(a) There exists I ∈ I such that b→ a+ I.
(b) For any I ∈ I , either a→ b+ I or b+ I → a.
Axiom 7 (Stability.) Suppose A,B ∈ E and J ∈ I . If nA → nB + J for
arbitrarily large values of n, then A→ B.
Axiom 8 (Mechanical states.) There exists a subset M ⊆ S of mechanical
states such that:
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(a) If l,m ∈M , then l +m ∈M .
(b) For l,m ∈M , if l→ m then m→ l.
Axiom 9 (State equivalence.) If E is a uniform eidostate then there exist
states e, x, y ∈ S such that x→ y and E + x↔ e+ y.
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